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Loyalty/reqUirement rebates and the 
Antitrust Modernization Commission: What 
is the appropriate liability standard? 
BY  NICHOLAS ECONOMIDES* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
A number of alternative economic standards have been proposed for 
establishing antitrust liability in cases with requirement/loyalty prac-
tices both in the context of a single product and multiproduct mar-
kets. In general terms, the problem can be described as follows. 
Single-product case: A dominant firm in market A sells at a constant 
per unit price. Provided the particular buyer commits to  buying a 
large percentage or all of his "needs" from the dominant firm,  the 
seHer also offers a "retroactive"! "discount"2  on all units or a subset of 
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The term "retroactive" is used because  the "discount" (or difference 
between prices adhering tC1  and not adhering to the requirement) applies to 
all lmits sold in a time period or a subset thereof, while it may be announced 
in the last part of this time period. This discount is distinguished from an 
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units below a certain threshold, such as 90%  of the buyer's purchases 
in market A  during a defined time period. The retroactive discount 
can be a lower price on all  units below the threshold or a subset of 
these, or it can be a lump-sum discount. The requirement may be 
"sole-sourcing," i.e., a requirement that a particular buyer buy 100% 
of his purchases from  the dominant firm, or the discount may be 
available only if a large percentage of the buyer's purchases in market 
A, say 85% or 90% or 95%, are from the dominant firm.3  The require-
ment, the base prices, the extent of the discounts, and even the time 
period on which it applies can vary across buyers.
4 
"incremental" discount which is  applied only to  the  last unit or units sold. 
For similar definitions, see European Commission, Guidance  on  the  Commis-
sion 's  EI~forcemcnt Priorities  in Applying Article  82  EC Treaty  to  Abusive Exclu-
sionary  Conduct by  Dominant  Undertakings  'If  36  (Dec.  2008)  [hereinafter Ell 
A,-ticlc 82 Guidance]. 
The word "discount" here can be misleading. A"ter meeting the con-
dition, the firm receives a price lower than that charged when the condition is 
not met. However, the price outside the condition as well as the price under 
the condition  may be higher than those of the but-for  world, cwd  therefore 
the "discount" can be illusory. Thus, a  loyalty discount can also be called a 
"disloyalty penalty." See  Nicholas Economides & Ioannis Lianos, The  Elusive 
Antitrust Standard  on  Bundling in  Europe and  in  the  United  States in  tlte  After-
math of  the Microsoft Cases,  ANTITRUST L.J. (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 3, 
on file  with the author); EIN"ER  EU- lAUGE, UNITED  STATES  ANTITRUST  LAW AND 
ECONOMICS 406, 408  (2008); Patrick Greenlee, David Reihnan & David S.  Sib-
ley, An Antitnlst Analysis  of Bundled  Loyalty Discount 23 (Dep't. of Justice, 
Econ. Analysis Group,  Discussion Paper No. 04-13,  2004);  Daniel L.  Rubin-
feld, 3M's Bundled Rebates: An Economic Perspective, 72 U. Cm L. RE V.  243, 252 
(2005). 
For the arguments I make here it is not necessary to have the discount 
apply to all units. 
The European Commission also distinguishes between individualized 
and standardized discounts. In contrast to U.s. antitrust law, EU's article 82 
may apply to both types of discounts, although standardized discounts are 
treated more leniently. See  ELf Article 82  Guidance, supra note I, 'If 44: 
It  is normally important to consider  whether the rebate system is 
applied with an individualized  or a standardized  threshold. An indi-
vidualized threshold-one based on a percentage of the total require-
ments of the  customer or an individualized volume target-allows L OYALTY R EBATES  261 
Multi-product case: A dominant finn in market A also sells in market 
B. It sells products A and B a la carte. Based on a requirement that a par-
ticular buyer buy a large percentage or 100% of his needs in both prod-
ucts from the dominant firm, the dominant firm also offers discounts on 
allmuts of either A, or B, or buth, or provides a lmop-sum cliscount.
5 
It makes sense to appiy the same antitrust standard for cliscolmts on 
loyalty /requirement practices irrespective of whether we are in a single-
product or multiproduct case. In the former case, the demand is divided 
between an uncontested part that is always purchased from  the donli-
nant firm and a contested part of the demand where the customer may 
buy from any firm.6  In both the multi- and single-product cases, the 
dominant firm leverages its monopoly or dominant position to obtain 
I1igher sales in the remaining market. The only difference is  that in the 
multiproduct case, sales in market A are leveraged to obtain higher sales 
in market B,  while in the single-product case, the uncontested sales in 
market A are leveraged to obtain the contested sales in market A.7 
Before going into the details of the proposed legal rules for liabil-
ity, it is worth making the following observations: 
the dominant supplier to set the threshold at such a level as to make it 
difficult for  customers to  switch suppliers,  thereby creating  a  maxi-
mum loyalty enhancing effect. By  contrast,  a  standardized volume 
threshold-where the threshold is  the same for all or a group of cus-
tomers-may be too high for some smaller customers and/or too low 
for larger customers to have a loyalty enhancing effect. If, however, it 
can be established that a  standardized volume threshold approxi-
mates the requirements of an appreciable proportion of customers, the 
Commission is likely to  consider that such a standardized system of 
rebates may produce cmticompetitive foreclosure effects. 
Paragraph 45 discusses the efficiencie.; provided by these two types of discounts. 
This setup can easily be extended to collections of more than two goods. 
This conforms with the definitions used by the European Commission. 
See  EU Article 82 Guidance, supra note 1. 
For a discussion of the "attraction effect"  of rebates from  the domi-
nant firm's perspective and the inherent bias of the system to perpetuate and 
reinforce the dominant firm's position in the market, see Martin Bechenkamp 
&  Frank P.  Maier-Rigaud, An Experimental  Investigation  of Aiticle 82  Rebates 
Schemes,  2 COMPE TITION  L.  RE V.  Supr. 1, 14 (2006).  Leveraging because of an 262  :  T HE  A NTITRUST  BULLETIN: Vol.  54, No.  2/Sum1l1er 2009 
A.  Requirementlloyalty programs can  be profitable for a 
dominant firm even if there are no cost savings from joint 
production, joint distribution of products A and B or from 
higher production levels 
As I will discuss below, the introduction of requirement/loyalty dis-
count programs can work for the benefit of the dominant firm because 
such programs enable the extension of the monopoly from one market 
to  the other or from one segment of the market to another segment of 
the market. Thus, the profitability for the dominant firm of the introduc-
tion of such a requirement/loyalty discount program is  not dependent 
on cost savings of joint production or joint distribution (economies of 
scope) in the multiproduct case, or on higher sales of operation and 
therefore wider spreading of fixed costs (economies of scale) in the sin-
gle-product case. The leverage can be a sufficient and profitable justifica-
tion for the introduction of requirement/loyalty discount programs in 
the absence of any cost savings of joint production, joint distribution, or 
higher sales of operation. If such savings exist,  they can be taken into 
consideration as efficiencies to  cOlmterbalance consumer losses, but cost 
savings are not necessary causes for a dominant firm to profitably intro-
duce a requirement/loyalty discount program. 
B.  Conditions under which such requirement/loyalty programs 
are not profitable for a dominant firm are eXCI'ptionaL 
Clearly a bundling program can be profitable because of savings 
in joint production or joint distribution costs. Similarly in the single-
product case, economies of scale can lead to  increased profits in the 
presence of a  loyalty discount program.  For the arguments of this 
subsec~ion, let us assume that there are no joint production or joint 
distribution savings in the multiproduct case or economies of scale 
in the single-product case. Under these circumstances, profit 
increases as a result of the introduction of the loyalty/requirement 
program must come from revenue enhancement. The objective of a 
attraction effect mLlY  have inspired the position of the EU  on conditional 
rebates. See  EU Article 82  Guidance,  supra  note 1,  ~l 38. See also  Ioal~nis Lianos 
& Abel Mateus, Antit11lst in  the  New  U.S.  /ldministratioll:  A Transatlantic  View, 
GLOBAL COMPETmON PoL'Y MAG.,  Jan. 2009, at 30, available at http://ssm.com 
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requirement/loyalty discount program then is  to extract more con-
sumer surplus and convert it to  profit of the seller
8  To  be profitable, 
the dominant firm's bundling scheme needs to  leverage some left-
over consumer surplus in market A to induce the buyer to buy more 
of product B from the dominant firm. If a buyer is left with no con-
sumer surplus before the bundle is introduced, the seller has no 
leverage to induce the buyer to  buy more of product B from him. 
Additionally, if a dominant firm in market A  is  able to  extract the 
full consumer surplus from each and every consumer in  market A, 
there is no additional surplus in  market A  that the dominant firm 
can gain by introducing a  requirement/loyalty program that 
involves market B. 
Thus, under very special conditions, when prior to  the introduc-
tion of the requirement/loyalty program a monopolist in market A is 
able to  extract the full consumer surplus from each and every con-
sumer in market A, the requirement/loyalty program would not be 
useful in increasing profits to a dominant firm
9  This can occur when 
each buyer buys only one unit and the seller is able to  sell to  each 
buyer at the price that buyer is willing to  pay, thereby leaving no con-
sumer surplus for  any buyer. Or, more generally, a seller sells many 
units to each buyer, but is able to offer very sophisticC1ted individually 
tailored pricing that extracts all consumer surplus from all  units 
bought by each buyer. 
In  the very spec;al case described above, profitable requirement/ 
loyalty practices can be explained only on the basis of efficiencies in 
Consumer surplus is  the difference between what consumers are will-
ing to pay and what they actually pay in a purchase. It represents the net ben-
efit to consumers. 
This assumes that the dominant firm cannot use threats that it will not 
sell  the full demanded quantity to  buyers that do not adhere to  the require-
ment program. When facing a competitor that is w1able to fulfill  the uncon-
tested part of the cemand, such threats can  easily be used to  threaten a 
reduction in  the profitability of buyers who have optimized their scale to·use 
the exact quantity they demand from  the dominant seller.  In that case, even 
when the dominant firm  is able  to  extract the full consumer surpl us from 
every consumer in market A,  it can still  use the threat of not selling to each 
buyer the full amount of the uncontested part of their demand so as to prot-
itably gain market share in market B or the contested part of market A. 264  :  THE  A NTITRUST  BULLETIN : Vol.  54, No. 2/Summer 2009 
joint production, joint distribution, or economies of scale. 1o  However, 
in many product markets, each buyer buys more than one unit and 
typically the same buyer assigns a different value (willingness to pay) 
to e~ch of the various units he demands. Then, each buyer is left with 
a  positive consumer surplus under a  single-price monopoly, and 
therefore the requirement program can help the monopolist to extract 
more surplus from each buyer in market A. Additionally, even if each 
buyer bought only one unit, typically different buyers vary in their 
willingness to  pay. Then again, a single-price monopolist will not be 
able to  extract all consumer surplus from the market.
ll The require-
ment/loyalty programs can be sufficiently tailored to the scale of each 
buyer (based on a percentage of his purchases of similar products) so 
that again more surplus is extracted by the monopolist. 
C.  Requirementlloyalty programs have implications dramatically 
different from  volume discounts, including possible negative 
prices for ranges of units 
A discount given on the basis of a  requirement/loyalty program 
should be applied to the units that are contested by a competitor in 
the same market, or in the second market in the multiproduct case. 
When such discounts are subtracted from revenue from contested 
units, the resulting effect!ve price for the contested units can be below 
cost, and even negative, as shown below. This is quite different from a 
volume discount for  the last few  units (an incremental discount) 
which  typically will result in  prices above cost. Additionally, a  vol-
ume discount (something like taking 15% off the price of units above 
unit 90) will affect the same set of units for each buyer. In contrast, a 
requirement/loyalty program can be written so that the discount will 
apply to  different buyers according to  the percentage of their pur-
chases from the dominant firm, and therefore it can affect different 
lmits for each buyer. For example, a discount based on a 90% require-
ment/loyalty program affects different units when applied to a buyer 
10  See Aaron Director & Edward H. Levi, Law and the Future:  Trade  Regu-
latiOH, 51  Nw. U. 1. RE V. 281, 290 (1956). 
II  Even a quantity-based price discount, if the same discount is available 
to  all buyers of the same quantity, will leave some consumer surplus with 
buyers when the buyers vary in their demand for the product. LOYHTY  R EBATES  265 
of 100 lffiits than when applied to a buyer of 1000 units. Finally, a vol-
ume discount will tend to be less restrictive since it will  not require 
that fewer purchases be made from the rival(s). 
D.  Requirementlloyalty retroactive rebates change the nature of 
competition from competition for  the last unit to competition 
for large chunks of  the demand 
Small changes in the amount bought from a rival can make a dif-
ference in whether a buyer receives a rebate from the dominant firm 
or not. For example, consider a buyer who buys 100  units in total 
from the dominant firm and the rival. If the dominant firm's lump-
sum rebate kicks in at the 90th lmit, it is  very lffilikely that the buyer 
will buy 89  units,  just short of achieving the quota necessary for  the 
rebate. A buyer that might have bought 80  units in the but-for world 
in the absence of the rebate will consider buying 90  units to  receive 
the rebate. Thus, competition is  no longer for  the last unit (the 81st 
unit to  be sold by the dominant firm) as in the but-for world, but for 
whole chtmks of the demand, here units 81  to  90.  This  favors the 
dominant firm and can lead to  foreclosure of the rival who has to 
fight not only for the 81st unit of the dominant firm (his 19th lmit) as 
in the but-for world, but for  lmits 81-90 (his units 10-19). This was 
lmderstood by the European Commission: 
Retroactive rebates may foreclose the market significantly, as they may 
make it less attractive for customers to switch small amounts of demand to 
an alternative supplier, if this would lead to luss of the retroactive rebates.I2 
~.  Entry  issues 
The existence of the requirement/loyalty practice by a dominant 
firm can foreclose rivals or reduce their scale of operations and 
increase their costs. At the same time, the requirement/loyalty prac-
tice raises the barriers to entry making the business environment less 
competitive.
13 In both the single-product and multiproduct cases, the 
monopolist can deter a  new entrant by :ocking customers iIlto a 
1.2  ELf Article 82 Cuidance, supra note I, 'II 15. 
,.'\  See  Barry Nalebuff, Bundling as  an  Entry Barrier,  119  Q.].  ECON. 159 
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requirement/loyalty contract. All other things being equal, the cus-
tomer will decide to  break the contract with the monopolist only if it 
is compensated by the new entrant's lower price. That is, the monopo-
list has lowered the incentives for entry and thus created barriers for a 
potential new entrant to compete as an efficient competitor.
14 
A dominant firm with market power in two markets where a typi-
cal buyer buys both products can protect itself from entry in either of 
the markets by offering the requirement/loyalty contract. Thus, 
requirement/ loyalty contracts may be used as entry-deterring devices 
by  making it economically unprofitable for an entrant to  enter one 
market without simultaneousiy entering the second market.ls 
II.  ALTERNATIVE STANDARDS FOR LIABILITY 
A number of alternative standards for liability have been pro-
posed. I discuss them from the most lenient standard to the strictest 
standard. 
A.  Total bundle cost/revenue comparison 
To  apply this standard, proposed by Professor Tim Muris to  the 
Antitrust Modernization Commission (AMC),16  first you calculate the 
total revenue paid for  a  blmdle under the requirement/loyalty con-
tract after all discounts are applied. If the resulting revenue is  above 
H  See Phillip Aghion & Patrick Bolton, Contracts  as  a Rarrier to  Elltry, 77 
AM.  ECON. REV.  388 (1987).  The paper shows that a monopolist can extract a 
new entrant's techn"logy advantage using contracts which require 100% of a 
customer's total purchases. 
I '  See,  e.g.,  Nalebuff, supra  note 13;  Rubinteld, supra  note  2,  at 257;  and 
Aaron S.  Edlin &  Daniel L.  Rubinfeld, Exclusio1l  or  Efficient  Pricing?  The  "Big 
Deal" Bundling of  Academic Journals,  72 ANTITRUST L.J. 119 (2004). 
16  See Timothy J.  Muris, Comments  011  Antitnlst Law,  Economics,  and  BUIl-
died  Discounts (submitted to  the AMC on behalf of the United States Telecom 
Ass'n, July IS,  2005).  Sec  also  Timothy J.  Muris,  Antitrust Law  &  Economics: 
Exclusionary  Behavior, Bundled Discounts and  Refusals  to  Deal  (Nov.  29,  2006). 
This standard was also proposed by Pacific Telephone Co. and Visa USA and 
rejected by the 9th Circuit in PeaceHealth.  See  Brief of Pacific Td. Co.  &  Visa 
USA as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellant, Cascade Health Solutions v. 
PeaceHealth, 542 F.3d 668 (9th Cir. 2008) (No. 05-36153). LOYA LTY REBATES :  267 
viHiable cost (avoidable cost), there is no !iability. If the resulting price 
is below avoidable cost, you examine whether the loss can be reason-
ably recouped. There \s antitrust liability only if the loss cannot be 
reasonably recouped. 
This standard completely ignores bundling issues. You  can easily 
have a collection of products sold above cost while some of the prod-
ucts are individually sold below cost. This concept of having a collec-
tion of products sold above cost while some are individually sold 
below cost has been well understood in telecommunications markets 
since the 1970s, when competition emerged in  some markets w hile 
monopoly remained in others. In effect, the Muris standard makes 
bundling per se legal, as pointed out by Jonathan Jacobson,17 since the 
Supreme Court has accepted a comparison of the defendants' costs 
and  revenues as a  predation test,  whether or not there is  bundling 
involved.ls Thus, the Muris standard is clearly inappropriate for judg-
ing bundling and requirement practices issues. 
B.  The AMC standard for multiproduct conditional discounts 
To apply this standard, you take all the conditional discounts given to 
a particular buyer and apply them to all the units of product B (the non-
monopolized product) sold by the dominant firm / monopolist in market 
A to this buyer, thereby creating an "effective price" for  product B. An 
antitrust violation exists only if  all three of the following conditions hold: 
(1) the resulting "effective price" is  below the average variable cost of 
product B of the monopolist in product A; (2) the dominant firm is likely to 
recoup its losses; and (3)  the requirement contract is likely to have anti-
competitive consequences. 19  The AMC suggests the  following safe har-
17  Jonathan M. Jacobson, Exploring  the Antitrust Modernization  Commis-
sioH's Proposed Test For Bundled Pricing, ANTITRUST, Summer 2007, at 23. 
18  See Brooke Group Ltd. v.  Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.s. 
209  (1993); and Weyerhaeuser Co. v.  Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., 
127 S. Ct. 1069 (2007). 
19  See  ANmRUST MODER NIZATION COMMISSION,  REPORT AND RECOMMENDA-
TIONS  99 (Apr. 2007)  ("Courts should adopt a  three-part test  to determine 
whether bWldled discounts or rebates violate Section 2 of the Sherman Act. 
To prove a violation of Section 2, a plaintiff should be required to show each 268  :  THE ANTITRUST BULL ETIN:  Vol.  54, No.  2/Summer 2009 
bor:  no antitrust violation exists  if the resulting effective price is  above 
average variable cost of product B of the monopolist in product A.20 
The AMC  standard for  multiproduct conditional discounts has a 
number of defects. First it uses the monopolist's costs rather than the 
rival's costs for the competitive product B, even though the rival can 
have higher costs because of the anticompetitive actions of the domi-
nant firm. For example, if there are increasing returns to scale in mar-
ket B,  the denial of scale to  the competitive firm in market B because 
of the dominant firm's actions will result in highel costs for the com-
petitive firm. Thus, if this standard is applied, the competitive firm 
can be foreclosed because it appears to be inefficient even when it 
would have been efficient (and therefore not foreclosed) but for  the 
anticompetitive effects of the requirement contract.
2l 
Second, even a higher-cost competitor can constrain price and 
increase consumer surplus. Therefore inefficient rivals should not be 
automatically excluded.22 This is a fundamental flaw of the test which 
looks only on  the production side of the market and disregards the 
one of the folloWing elements (as well as other elements of a Section 2 claim): 
(1)  after allocating all discounts and rebates attributable to the entire bW1dle 
of products  to  the competitive product,  the defendant sold the competitive 
product below  its incremental cost for the competitive product; (2) the defen-
dant is likely  to recoup these short-term losses; and (3) the bllndled discount 
or rebate program has had or is likely to have an adverse effect on  competi-
tion."). See also ELHAUGE, supra note 2, at 413. 
'0  The AMC uses the words "incremental cost" in its cost criterion. Often 
a"erage variable  cost (AVC)  is  used instead. The EU  uses the terminology 
dverage avoidable costs (AAC) to denote costs that can be avoided jf the units 
in  queStion  are not prod uced. See  infra  section  II.D. However,  it should be 
understood  that AAC and AVC  include the cost of addition;]l plants (or plant 
expansion) and fixed investment required to produce the additionaillnits. 
"  See Economides &  Lianos, SUpl"a note 2, at 20; ELHAUGE, Sltyl"a  note 2, 
at 412. 
'YI  Excluding entrant:..;  on the grounds of productive inefficiency (or cre-
ating tests  that would exclude less efficient entrants out of hand) can  reduce 
consumer surplus and increase allocative inefficiency (divergence of prices 
from  costs). See, e.g.,  Nicholas Economides &  Lawrence  J.  White, Access and 
Interconnection Pricing:  How  Efficient is the  "Efficiellt Component Pricing Rule"7, 
40  ANTITRUST  BULL.  557 (1995); Nicholas Economides & Lawrence J.  White, The LOY.\LTY  REBATES  269 
effects of market organization on consumer surplus. Since consumer 
surplus can increase because of entty of even an inefficient rival when 
the inefficient rival prices below the monopoly price of the dominant 
firm, requiring productive efficiency of a nondominant rival (as  the 
test does) may conflict with achieving higher consumer surplus. 
Thus, application of the AMC standard will result in a number of 
false negatives to the detriment of consumers. If a test such as the one 
proposed by the AMC is to be employed, it should compare the effec-
tive price with the rival's costs when the rival is  operating efficiently. 
The crucial question is  whether the rival in market B could survive if 
acting efficiently, not the monopolist, and if the entry or survival of 
the rival constrains prices and increases consumer surplus. 
Third, in the presence of product differentiation (either in variety 
or in quality) the AMC test makes little sense. Since a rival to the dom-
inant firm does not offer the same products, why should we be using 
the dominant firm's  cos~s to evaluate the survival of the rival's prod-
ucts that differ in quality and variety from those of the dominant firm? 
Moreover, when the products are differentiated, consumers may gain 
from the presence of additional varieties and qualities offered by the 
rival even if the rival prices higher than the dominant firm.23 
Fourth, if such a test is to be used, it should be applied only to the 
contested units of products A or B (or both), and not to all units of A or 
to all  lmits of 8, again asking the questions whether the rival can sur-
vive under the requirement practice and if consumer surplus increases 
in the presence of the rival.
24 In many markets, a Significant portion of 
Inefficiency of the  ECPR  Yet  Again: A  Reply  to  Larsol1,  43  ANTITRU ST  BULL.  429 
(1998);  Nicholas Economides, The  Tragic  Inefficiency of M-ECPR,  in  DOWN TO 
THE  WIRE: STUDIES  IN  THE  DIFFUSION  AND REGUL ATION  OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
TE CHNOLOGfES 142 (Allan 1. Shampine ed., 2003). 
"  See Steven C. Salop, Question: What is the Real alld Proper Antirust Wel-
fare  Standard (Statement to AMC, Nov. 4, 2005) and Steven C  Salop, Exclusion-
ary  Conduct,  Effect  011  COl1sUJllerS,  and  the  Flawed  Profit-Sacrifice  Standard,  73 
ANIDRUST L} 311  (2006); Nicholas Economides, Quality Variatiolls in the Circu-
lar Model ot" Differentiated Products, 23 RE GIONAL ScI. & URB. ECON. 235 (1993). 
CI  This, of course, is not because antitrust is concerned with the survival 
of the rival per se, but because the survival of the rival  will constrain price 
and increase variety and quality to the benefit of consumers. 270  THE  A NTITRUST  B ULL ETIN : Vol.  54, No.  2jSummer 2009 
the sales of the dorrunant firm is uncontested by competitors. This may 
be because of reputation, fear of punishment of executives if some-
thing goes wrong when they do not buy from the dominant firm 
("nobody gets fired for  buying from IBM"), complementary invest-
me~ts by buyers of the dominant product, lirrutations in the produc-
tion capacity of the competitor, and many other reasons. Obviously the 
dominant firm does not offer a loyalty discount to attract buyers to the 
uncontested part of the demand since it already is  able to  sell  these 
units at full  price. Instead, the requirement/ loyalty discount is offered 
to attract customers in the contested part of the demand. Therefore its 
impact has tv  be analyzed on that part of the demand. VVhether  the 
loyalty discount is applied to  the contested pMt of the demand or not 
can make a big difference to  the outcome of the test, as we will see 
below in the discussion of the EU guidance standard, which applies 
the discount only to the contested part of the demand. 
Fifth, the loyalty / requirement discount reduces price transparency 
and thereby may decrease competition. It will be difficult for a rival to 
accurately calculate the effective price offered by the dominant firm to 
particular buyers and thereby attempt to  match it.
25 This uncertainty 
may reduce price competition, and this is ignored by the proposed test. 
Sixth, the recoupment prong is  irrelevant because it is not clear 
that the monopolist actually loses money under the requirement con-
tract compared to  the but-for world. The difference between prices 
with and without the requirement contract does not necessarily imply 
losses for the monopolist because the monopolist can increase both a 
la carte and bundle prices as  the introduction and acceptance of the 
requirement contract gives him more market power. When the domi-
nantfirm's price outside the requirement/ loyalty contract is  higher 
than in the but-for world, this is  an indication that the action is anti-
competitive.
26 To see this, consider the model of Greenlee et alY They 
25  Additionally, buyers may find it difficult to  compare prices in a la 
carte and bundled offerings.  See  Barry Na lebuff,  Exclusionary  Bundling, 50 
A NTITRUST BULL. 321, 322 (2U05). 
26  Sec Economides & Lianos, supra  note 2,  at 21;  Einer Elha uge,  Defining 
Retter Monopolization Standards, 56 STAN. 1. REV.  253, 284-94 (200:1). 
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show how a monopolist can extend his monopoly in market A to mar-
ket B through offering the bundling scheme with a requirement that all 
or almost all purchases be made from the monopolist and simultane-
ously increasing the price of the monopolized product when it is 
offered on a stand-alone basis. Greenlee et at. show in their theorem 2 
that the application of this bundling scheme reduces consumer welfare. 
They devise a test to ascertain whether there are consumer losses for 
the case of undifferentiated products: "If the firm maximizes profits 
and the standalone price of A exceeds the initial price of A, then we 
can infer that the bundled rebate reduces consumer  welfare. " ~ The 
fact that a dominant firm's profit sacrifice is not necessary in  a 
requirement/loyalty rebate is  shared by the European Commission: 
"Conditional rebates can have such [actual and potential foreclosure] 
effects without necessarily entailing a sacrifice for  the dominant 
undertaking,"29  with accompanying footnote: "In that regard, the 
assessment of conditional rebates differs from that of predation, 
which always entails a  sacrifice."~ Thus, the analysis of requirement/ 
loyalty programs under the modified  predatory pricing standard of 
the AMC is misguided.
3
! 
Seventh, the acceptance of the requirement contract by buyers 
does not necessarily imply higher consumer surplus since buyers find 
themselves in a prisoners' dilemma setting. It  may be optimal individ-
ually for  each buyer to  buy under the requirement so that he is not 
penalized by the higher prices outside the requirement, but collec-
tively all buyers lose because of the increase in market power of the 
monopolist as  more buyers accept the requirement. An individual 
28  Id.  at 23.  See  also  E LHAUGE, supra  note 2,  at 409  ("Consumer welfare 
will be harmed without any substantial foreclosure, as long as the standalone 
price exceeds the but-for independent monopoly price, unless there are offset-
ting efficiencies."). 
Ell Article 82 Guidance, supra note 1, at '1114. 
[d. at 14 n.26. 
31  Additionally, bundling can also be used to create threats of higher Q  la 
carte prices, even if all  consumers buy under the bundle and therefore the 
threat of buying at higher a la carte prices is not enforced at equilibrium. See, 
e.g., Barry Nalebuff, Tried  and True  Exclusion, 1 COMPETITION  POL'Y INT'L  41 
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buyer's acquiescence to buying under the requirement does not imply 
that collectively buyers are better off compared to the but-for world. 
Eighth, the third  prong of the test is also irrelevant. There is  no 
need  to  look for additional anticompetitive consequences since the 
requirement/loyalty practice itself can result in such. 
In summary, compared to  the but-for world, consumer surplus can 
decrease because of the introduction of the requi~ement practice even in 
AMC's safe harbor where the effective price exceeds avoidable cost. 
Product differentiatiuf'. makes the safe harbor even less applicable. 
Adoption of the AMC standard could result in exclusionary conduct 
that would not violate the test. Because of all the reasons above, the safe 
harbor proposed by the AMC-no antitrust violation exists if the result-
ing effective price is  above average variable cost of product B of the 
monopolist in product A-may result in exclusionary conduct that 
would not violate the test. The above shows that there are many actions 
that qualify for the AMC safe harbor that are still harmful to consumers. 
C.  The  Peace  Health standard of the Ninth Circuit 
for multiproduct conditional discounts 
The PeaceHealth standard is essentially the first prong of the AMC 
test. It works as follows. Take all  the conditional discounts and apply 
them to all the units of product B (the nonrnonopolized product) sold 
to a  particular buyer by  the monopolist in A.  An antitmst violation 
exists only if the resulting effective price is below the average variable 
cost of the monopolist.
32 This safe harbor standard was adopted by the 
U.s. Department of Justice under the George W. Bush administration 
in the single-firm section 2 report"  but was recently rescinded by the 
Department of Justice under the Obama administration, together with 
the rest of the enforcement provisions of the section 2 report.
34 
32  See Cascade Health Solutions v.  PeaceHealth, 515 F.3d 883, 906-10 (9th 
Cir.2008). 
"  See  Dep't of Justice,  C01npetitio11  and M011opoly:  Single-Firm  Conduct 
Under Section 2 o.fthe Shennan Act 101 (Sept. 2008). 
"  See Press Release, Justice Deparhnent Withdraws Report on Antitrust 
Monopoly Law, (May 11, 2009), amilable at http://wvVwusdoj.gov  I atr/public 
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All the criticisms of the AMC standard applYt except that recoup-
ment is not required by the PeaceHealth  standard. Adoption of this 
standard would result in many violations that would not be caught. 
D.  The  EU Article 82 GuidancF 
To  apply the European Corrunission test, one first determines the 
"effective price" by applying all discolUlts to  the "contestable" units 
of product B (the norunonopolized product) in the multiproduct case, 
or to the "contestable" units of product A  in the single-product case. 
The contestable part of the market is defined as "how much of a cus-
tomer's purchase requirements can realistically be switched to a 
rival."36  An antitrust violation exists if  the resulting effective price is 
below average avoidable cost of the monopolist. An antitrust violation 
may exist if the resulting effective price is  above average avoidable 
cost of the monopolist, based on more detailed examination. In partiCll-
lar, the Commission notes: 
Where the effective price is between [average avoidable cost] and [long run 
average incremental cost], the Commission will investigate whether other 
factors point to the conclusion that entry or expansion ev~'n by as efficient 
competitors is likely to  be affected. In this context, the Commission will 
investigate whether and to  what extent rivals have realistic and effective 
counterstrategies at their disposal, for instance their capacity to  also use a 
"noncontestable" portion of their buyer's demand as leverage to decrease 
the price for the relevant range. Where competitors do nut have such coun-
terstrategies at their disposal, the Commission will consider that the rebate 
scheme is capable of foreclosing equally efficient competitors. q 
This test uses the monopolist's costs rather than the competitor's 
costs, even though the entrant can have higher costs because of the 
anticompetitive actions of the monopolist; in any case, a higher-cost 
competitor can constrain price and increase consumer surplus-there-
fore inefficient competitors should not be excluded. The test is 
applied correctly to the contested  units (in either a single-product or a 
multiproduct case). The impact of the loyalty discount is  cor~ectly 
Ell Article 82 Guidance, supra note 1, at 'II 14. 
36  Id. at 'illS. 
37  ELf Article 82  Guidance, supra note 1, at 'II  43.  Long run average incre-
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applied to the contested units, where its effect is  large, rather than to 
all units, which include the portion of the monopolist's sales that are 
not contested and would have remained with the monopolist in  the 
abse~ce of a discount.
3S  Because the European Commission applies 
the discounts to a  relatively small number of units while the AMC 
and  PeaceHealth  standards apply the discounts to all  units, the Com-
mission approach will correctly discover violations which would 
remain undiscovered by the AMC and PeaceHealth standards. 
For example, assume that the total requirement of a buyer is  100 
units, the dominant firm's list price is $100, and the dominant firm 
offers a lump-sum rebate of $1000 conditional on the dominant firm 
selling a number of units that includes all the uncontested units and 
some of the contested units of this buyer. If the contested number of 
units  is  80  and the discount is  available when at least 20  units are 
bought from the dominant firm, the effective price is  $((100x80) -
1000)/80 =  $7000/ 80 = $87.50, and the percentage discount on the 
contested units is (list price - effective price) / (list price) = 12.5%.  As 
the contested number of units decreases and the required number of 
units to get the discount increases, the implied discounts rise dramati-
cally as seen in the table. For example, when the contested number of 
units is 30, the percentage discount is 33%; when the contested num-
ber of lmits is  20,  the percentage discount is 50%;  15 contested units 
imply a discount of 67%; 10 contested lLnitS, a discount of 100% (zero 
effective price); and 5 contested units a discount of 200% and a nega-
tive effective price. Notice that this lump sum discount, which is only 
12.5% of the total revenue of the dominant firm from this customer 
($1000/$100x80 = 12.5%), has crucial anticompetitive consequences 
when the contested number of units is  relatively small. The effective 
price can even be  negative (here if  the number of contested units is 
38  In applying this standard in its Illtel  decision, the European Commis-
sion notes that the contestable part of the market can be small. European 
Union, Press Release, Antitrust: Commission imposes fine of €1.06 bn on Intel 
for abuse of dominant position; orders Intel to cease illegal practices (May 13, 
2009), a'llailable at http://europa.eu/ rapid/ pressReleasesAction.do?reference 
=IP / 09 /745&fonnat=HTML ("Because computer manufacturers are depend-
ent on Intel for a majority of their x86 CPU supplies, only a limited part of a 
computer manufacturer's x86  CPU requirements is  open to  competition at 
any given time."). L OYALTY  R EBATES :  275 
below 10, i.e., contested market share is beiow 10%) and therefore 
impossible to  match by a competitor.
39  Thus, in cases where the con-
tested market share is small (here 10% or less), one can establish anti-
competitive foreclosure effects of the requirement contract even 
without knowledge of costs, since costs are not negative. The table 
summarizes the results based on different assumptions on the num-
ber of contested units. 
Table 
Contested  Required  Effective  <Effective  Percentage 
Units by  Units for  Price  OIL  Price!!  Discount 011 
the Rival  Discount  Contested  (List Price)  Contested 
are a  t Lens t  Units  Units' 
80  20  $87.5  87.5%  12.5% 
30  70  $67  67%  33% 
20  80  $50  50%  50% 
15  85  $33  33%  67% 
10  90  $0  0%  100% 
5  95  -$100  -100%  200% 
*The variable "percentage discount on contested units" is defined as (list price - effec-
tive price)/(list price):o 100% - (effective price)/(list price). 
39  In its Intel  decision, the European Commission provides an example 
of a rival to  the dominant firm that was unable to  "sell" its product at zero 
price because of Intel's loyalty/requirement practice. A computer manufac-
turer refused an offer to  "buy" crus fromAdvanced Micro  Devices, Inc 
(AMD) at zero price because, if it did, it would forgo Intel's loyalty discount, 
which was based on the requirement that this buyer buy a very large share of 
its CPU needs from Intel. Id.  ("Moreover, in order to be able to compete with 
the Intel rebates, for the part of the computer manufacturers' supplies that 
was up for grabs, a competitor that was just as efficient as Intel would have 
had to offer a price for its CPUs lower than its costs of producing those CPUs, 
even if the average price of its CPUs was lower than that of Intel. For exam-
ple, rival chip manufacturer AMD offered one million free CPUs to  one par-
ticular computer manufacturer. If the  computer manufacturer had accepted 
all of these, it would have lost Intel's rebate on its many millions of remaining 
CPU purchases, and  would have been worse off overall simply for having 
accepted this highly competitive offer. In the end, the computer manufacturer 
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E.  The Ortho test 
Under the standard in OrOw, a loyalty/ requirement bundled dis-
count by a monopolist is considered anticompetitive when either "(a) 
the monopolist has priced below its  average variable cost or (b)  the 
plaintiff is at least as efficient a producer of the competitive product 
as the defendant, but .. . the defendant's pricing makes it unprofitable 
for the plaintiff to continue to produce."4o 
The first test for liability in Ortho is very much like the A.t\llC  test, 
examining whether the dominant firm is  pricing below its incremen-
tal cost. The second alternative requirement for  liability tests whether 
an efficient plaintiff in product B is  able to  survive given the pricing 
of the dominant firm. This test is  different from the AMC test in the 
following ways. First, in the absence of joint production or jOint distri-
bution cost savings, it allows liability to be established when the dom-
inant firm and the rival have the same cost ClIrue/junction for product 
B, but the pricing actions (requirement/ loyalty programs) of the dom-
inant firm restrict the scale of the rival so that its unit cost at the scale 
at which it operates is  so  high that it does not allow it to survive. 
Thus, it eliminates one of the problems of the AMC test. 
Second, this test is based on the efficiency of the rival in produc-
tion of only product B.  It is  less likely to  find  liability than the Euro-
pean Commission test because it essentially  treats the total 
production of B by the plaintiff as  the "contested units" rather than 
the truly contested number, which may be smaller. 
In general, there is no correspondence between consumer surplus 
changes and success or failure in the Ortlw test. Thus, while the Ortho 
test may provide indications of liability, it cannot be Jsed as a rule for 
antitrust liabiiity. 
F.  Structured rule of reason 
Under the structured rule of reason approacr: that 1 propose, the 
court should .ook at a  number of variables to  (\scer~ain whether a 
requirement/ loyalty program violates antitrust iaw, with the central 
40  Ortho Diagnostic Sys./ Inc.  v.  Abbott Labs., Inc., 920 F.  Supp. 455,  469 
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question being whether the introduction of the requirement/loyalty 
program reduces consumer surplus. Using this approach, a safe har-
bor cannot be established based on a  price / cost test. This is essen-
tially because changes in consumer surplus as a  result of entry or 
expanded operation of a  rival nondominant firm do not, in general, 
correspond directly to any price/ cost comparison, as I have argued in 
the criticism of the AMC standard. Under the structured rule of rea-
:,on standard, a violation can be established even when none is found 
by the previous tests, and in particular even when the calculated 
"effective" price is above the average variable cost of the dominant 
firm.41 
The court should look for  reductions of consumer surplus as a 
result of the introduction and acceptance of the requirement/loyalty 
practice. Among other circumstances, anticompetitive effects are 
established if any of the following is  true in cases of homogeneous 
goods: 
1.  the effective price based  on contested units (defined  above for 
either good A or B, or a combination of A and B)  is below the incre-
mental cost of the dominant firm including an allocation of avoid-
able fixed costs; 
2.  the effective price based on contested units (defined above for 
either good A or B, or a combination of A and B)  is below the incre-
mental cost of the competing firm including an allocation of avoid-
able fixed costs, and it can be shown that the elimination  of the 
competing fi rm  reduces competition and decreases  consumer sur-
plus; or 
3.  the dominant firm's price outside the requirement/ loyalty contract 
is higher than in the but-for world. 
When the effective price based on contested Lmits (defined above 
for  either good A  or B,  or a combination of A  and B)  is  below the 
;acremental cost of the dominant firm including an allocation of 
avoidable fixed costs, the dominant firm is selling below its own cost. 
There is no plausible justification for  this, so this is a clear  indic~tion 
of an antitrust violation. 
41  In LePage's v. 3M Co , 324  F.3d  141  (3rd Cir.  2003),  the court did not 
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When the effective price based on contested units (defined above 
for either good A  or B,  or a  combination of A  and B)  is below the 
incrementa: cost of the competing firm including an allocation of 
avoidable fixed costs, the dominant firm is selling the contested units 
at (in effective price that cannot be matched by the competitor, leading 
to the withdrawal of the competitor from the market. If the rival is 
equally efficient as the dominant firm,  this test collapses to test (1), 
and antitrust liability is  immediately established. If the rival firm is 
inefficient and its costs are higher than the dominant firm's when 
evaluated at the production levels of both firms at the market equilib-
rium under the  requirement contract, the court should first look at 
whether the rival has the same cost curve!function  as the dominant 
firm and whether its scale has been curtailed because of the anticom-
petitive acts of the dominant firm. If both of these are true, we fall 
back to test (1).  If the rival's cost curve is  higher than the dominant 
firm's in the but-for world, the court should analyze whether the ben-
efits to consumers in  the but-for world are eliminated or diminished 
by the requirement/ loyalty practice. 
As discussed earlie:- in the section on the AMC standard, if  the 
price outside the requirement (for example, the a la carte price in the 
multiproduct case) is above the but-for price, this is a clear indication 
of a reduction in consumer surplus as an effect of the introduction of 
the requirement contract.'ll  Additionally, when re-entry is difficult, 
any temporary benefit to consumers arising from low prices that 
leads to  the rival's exit will disappear after the rival's exit when the 
dominant firm will increase its prices. 
III.  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
I have discussed various standards that have been proposed to 
establish antitrust liability in cases of requirement/ loyalty contracts. I 
have criticized the AMC test because, among other reasons, it failed to 
establish a correspondence between consumer surplus reductions as a 
result of the requirement/ loyalty practice and the price  / cost test it 
proposed. Additionally, I showed that the AMC test will tend to show 
no liability where liability is  present. The European Commission 
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price/cost test is significantly better than the AMC test because:t cor-
rectly applies the loyalty discounts only to  the units contested by 
rivals.  However, even this test falls  short for  a number of reasons, 
including not taking into accolU1t product differentiation and the fact 
that even an inefficient competitor can constrain a dominant firm's 
pricing and thereby increase consumer surplus. J proposed a struc-
tured rule of reason test that does not include a safe harbor price/cost 
test but instead relies on consumer surplus comparisons. In the case 
uf homogeneous goods, I show how price/cost tests may be used as 
part of the structured rule of reason test to establish liability. 